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Abstract-Theories of similarity generally agree that the simi-
larity ofa pair increases with its commonalities and decreases
with its differences. Recent research suggests that this compar-
ison process involves an alignment of structured representa-
tions yielding commonalities, differences related to the com-
monalities, and differences unrelated to the commonalities.
One counterintuitive prediction of this view is that it should be
easier to find the differences between pairs ofsimilar items than
to find the differences between pairs of dissimilar items. This
prediction is particularly strong for differences that are related
to the commonalities. We tested this prediction in two experi-
ments in which subjects listed a single difference for each of a
number of word pairs. The results are consistent with the pre-
dictions of structural alignment. In light of these findings, we
discuss the potential role of structural alignment in other cog-
nitive processes that involve comparisons.
The process of determining the similarity of a pair of items is
central to diverse mental processes, including categorization
(Smith   Medin, 1981), problem solving (Novick, 1990; Ross,
1987), and affect (Kahneman   Miller, 1986). The general
consensus of research on similarity is that a pair s similarity
increases with its commonalities and decreases with its differ-
ences (Tversky, 1977). Much recent research extends this gen-
eral point by suggesting that similarity comparisons involve a
process ofstructural alignment akin to the comparison process
involved in analogy (Gentner   Markman, in press; Goldstone,
Medin,   Gentner, 1991; Markman   Gentner, 1993a, 1993b;
Medin, Goldstone,   Gentner, 1993). This view assumes that
mental representations consist of hierarchical systems that en-
code objects, attributes of objects, relations between objects,
and relations between relations. These structured representa-
tions may encode information about perceptual as well as con-
ceptual relations. For example, the configurations in Figure la
could be represented by the structural representations depicted
in Figure lb.
As in the structure-mapping theory of analogy (Gentner,
1983), we assume that the process of comparison is one of struc-
tural alignment between two mental representations to find the
maximal structurally consistent match between them. A struc-
turally consistent match is one that satisfies the constraints of
parallel connectivity and one-to-one mapping (Falkenhainer,
Forbus,   Gentner, 1989; Gentner, 1983, 1989; Holyoak  
Thagard, 1989; Keane, 1988; Markman   Gentner, 1993b; Me-
din, Goldstone,   Gentner, 1990, 1993). Parallel connectivity
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says that if two predicates are matched, then their arguments
must also match. For example, if the "above" relations in the
configurations in Figure 1 are matched, then the two items on
top must be placed in correspondence (the striped circle with
the striped square), and likewise the two items on the bottom
must be placed in correspondence (the checked square with the
checked circle). One-to-one mapping requires that each element
in one representation correspond to at most one element in the
other representation. Thus, in Figure 1, the circle in the left-
hand configuration could not be placed in correspondence si-
multaneously with both the circle and the square in the right-
hand configuration. As this example illustrates, in many cases
more than one structurally consistent interpretation is possible
for a given comparison. Here, on one interpretation, the com-
monality is that both configurations contain circles. On another
interpretation, the commonality is that both have something
above something else.
According to the systematicity principle (Gentner, 1983,
1989), when there are multiple interpretations of a pair, all else
being equal, the one that preserves the maximal (i.e., largest
and deepest) connected relational structure is preferred (Forbus
  Gentner, 1989; Gentner   Landers, 1985; Gentner, Ratter-
mann,   Forbus, 1993). This interpretation can then be used to
calculate a similarity rating for the items or to subserve some
other cognitive process that requires a comparison.
On this account, the commonalities and differences of a pair
are determined relative to an interpretation (Falkenhainer et al.,
1989; Markman   Gentner, 1993a; Medin et al., 1993). The
commonalities are simply the elements of the matching repre-
sentational structure. For example, the best interpretation of
the comparison in Figure 1 might involve placing the "above"
relations in correspondence, making that relation a commonal-
ity. The differences are separated into two types: those related
to the common structure (called alignable differences) and
those not related to the common structure (called nonalignable
differences). For example, on this interpretation, the fact that
the circle is on top in one configuration while the square is on
top in the other is an alignable difference, because the circle and
square are nonidentical elements placed in correspondence by
virtue of their like roles in matching structures. In contrast, the
triangle in the left-hand configuration is a nonalignable differ-
ence, because it does not correspond to anything in the right-
hand configuration. To put it another way, alignable differences
arise from and are connected to the common structure, whereas
nonalignable differences are independent of the common struc-
ture.
This proposal is related to previous suggestions that similar-
ity focuses primarily on the commonalities of a pair (Krum-
hansl, 1978; Sjoberg, 1972). Our proposal goes beyond this idea
in suggesting that not only are commonalities central, but even
VOL. 5, NO. 3, MAY 1994the differences that are considered are those related to the com-
monalities (i.e., the alignable differences). In other studies, we
provided evidence for this view by asking subjects to list
the commonalities and differences of word pairs (Markman  
Gentner, 1993a). We found that subjects could list more com-
monalities for similar pairs of words than for dissimilar pairs.
However, the reverse did not hold: Subjects did not list more
differences for dissimilar pairs than for similar pairs. Instead, as
we would expect if commonalities and alignable differences are
deeply related, subjects listed more alignable differences for
similar pairs than for dissimilar pairs and more nonalignable
differences for dissimilar pairs than for similar pairs. The total
number of differences was roughly consistent across similarity.
Further sorting tasks revealed conceptual relationships be-
tween the commonalities and the alignable differences, but not
between the commonalities and the nonalignable differences,
bearing out the claim that alignable differences are related to
commonalities but nonalignable differences are not. Indeed, the
number of commonalities was positively correlated with the
number of alignable differences, but not with the number of
nonalignable differences. Finally, there was evidence that align-
able differences are considered more important than nonalign-
able differences in that subjects listed more alignable differ-
ences than nonalignable differences overall.
The idea that alignable differences are more salient in the
comparison process than are nonalignable differences has one
startling implication. Because there are more commonalities for
similar pairs than for dissimilar pairs, there should also be more
alignable differences for similar pairs than for dissimilar pairs.
Thus, if, as suggested by the previous findings, subjects find it
Fig. 1. Illustration of the role of alignment in comparison. The
geometric configurations (a) can be encoded by the structured
representations in (b). In these structured representations,
ovals denote relations, rounded boxes denote objects, and bold
rounded boxes denote attributes. "Med" denotes "medium
sized."
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Fig. 2. Venn diagrams illustrating the comparison of a similar
pair and a dissimilar pair.
easier to report commonalities for high-similarity pairs than for
low-similarity pairs, then they should generally be able to find
differences (at least alignable differences) more easily for sim-
ilar pairs than for dissimilar pairs.
The idea that differences are easier to find for similar pairs
than for dissimilar pairs runs against the plausible intuition that
differences should be easier to find the more different the pair.
We schematize this intuition in Figure 2, borrowed from Tver-
sky (1977). The objects  representations are the sets of proper-
ties represented by the circles, and the match between repre-
sentations corresponds to the overlap of the sets. This diagram
suggests that all objects are represented in equal detail and that
there should be more differences for dissimilar pairs than for
similar pairs provided that the commonalities and differences
are independent of one another. Thus, differences should be
easier to find for dissimilar pairs than for similar pairs. 
The two studies we present here examine the claim that
subjects should find differences more easily for pairs of similar
items than for pairs of dissimilar items. In the first experiment,
subjects saw 40 word pairs on a sheet of paper and were told to
write one difference for as many different pairs as they could.
They were told that they would not have enough time to re-
spond to all of the pairs, so they should try to do the easy pairs
first. Half the pairs were of high similarity and half were of low
similarity (based on intuitions that were confirmed by subjects 
similarity ratings).
The predictions are straightforward, though counterintui-
tive. If similarity comparisons involve structural alignment,
then subjects should list more differences (and particularly
more alignable differences) for similar pairs than for dissimilar
pairs.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Subjects
The subjects in the difference listing task were 32 undergrad-
uate students from Northwestern University who received
course credit in introductory psychology for their participation.
The subjects in the similarity rating task were 40 undergraduate
students from the same population.
1. Such an independent-features account is consistent with,, but not
mandated by, Tversky s (1977) contrast model.
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Materials
The same 80 words were used to create two stimulus sets. In
each set, there were 20 similar pairs and 20 dissimilar pairs. The
second stimulus set was created from the first by re-pairing
high-similarity pairs to form low-similarity pairs and low-
similarity pairs to form high-similarity pairs. High- and low-
similarity pairs were generated initially by the experimenters 
intuitions. Similarity ratings obtained from independent sub-
jects yielded a mean similarity of 7.00 for the high-similarity
pairs and 1.67 for the low-similarity pairs (on a 9-point scale).
The complete set of stimuli is presented in the appendix. The
40 word pairs in a set were ordered randomly in two columns on
a single page. Four different orders were made for each stimu-
lus set.
Procedure
Subjects were told that they would see 40 word pairs on a
page, and that they should list one difference for as many dif-
ferent pairs as they could. They were informed that they would
have only 5 min to perform this task. They were warned that 5
min was not enough time to list one difference for every pair, so
they should do the "easiest" pairs first. Subjects were run in
small groups, and the experimenter timed the experiment with
a watch.
Scoring
The criterion used to separate alignable differences from
nonalignable differences was a modified version of the tech-
nique we have described elsewhere (Markman   Gentner,
1993a). A listed difference was counted as an alignable differ-
ence if (a) the subject mentioned contrasting properties of the
two items (e.g., "A hotel is expensive; a motel is cheap") or (b)
the subject used an explicit comparative construction (e.g., "A
hotel is more expensive than a motel"). All other differences
were considered nonalignable differences, including simple ne-
gation of one item s property as applied to the other (e.g., "You
read a magazine, but you do not read a kitten"). The only
exception to this rule was that a difference counted as an align-
able difference if the two raters agreed that people generally
represent the absence of a property explicitly for a given object
(e.g., a convertible is specifically a car that does not have a
roof). Properties of the words themselves (e.g., "One begins
with an h, the other with an m") were not counted. Each dif-
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ference was scored as either alignable or nonalignable. Two
different raters each scored the entire data set individually. The
initial scorings showed 97% agreement, and all discrepancies
were resolved by discussion.
Design
There were two levels of similarity (low, high) run within
subjects. The two stimulus sets were presented to different
groups of subjects (16 subjects per set) in four different orders
(4 subjects per order). For each subject and each item, the total
number of differences listed was determined, as were the num-
bers of alignable and nonalignable differences listed.
Results and Discussion
Number of differences listed
The results are presented in Table 1. Repeated measures
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with the number of differences
listed by each subject as a within-subjects factor and the stim-
ulus set as a between-subjects factor were performed for the
total number of differences, the number of alignable differ-
ences, and the number of nonalignable differences listed by
each subject. Because none of the analyses showed main effects
or interactions of stimulus set (all Fs < 1), we do not consider
this factor further.
As predicted by the structural alignment view, subjects
listed differences for more high-similarity pairs (M = 11.44)
than low-similarity pairs (M = 5.88), F(l, 30) = 31.88, p <
.001. Subjects, then, apparently found it considerably easier
to list differences for high-similarity pairs than for low-
similarity pairs. Also consistent with the structural alignment
position, this difference was specifically concentrated in the
number of alignable differences listed: Subjects listed signifi-
cantly more alignable differences for the high-similarity pairs
(M = 8.97) than for the low-similarity pairs (M = 3.88), F(1, 30)
= 31.37, p < .001. In contrast, no significant difference was
found for the number of nonalignable differences listed for
the high-similarity (M = 2.47) versus low-similarity (M = 2.00)
pairs, F(1, 30) = 1.39, p > .10. Taken together, these findings
are consistent with the view that comparison-even for the pur-
pose of finding differences-is accomplished via an alignment
process.
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Table 1. Mean number of differences listed for high- and low-similarity items in Experiments 1 and 2
Alignable differences Nonalignable differences Total
Experiment
Low
similarity
High
similarity
Low
similarity
High
similarity
Low
similarity
High
similarity
1
2
3.88
11.54
8.97  
15.63 
2.00
2.25
2.47
2.79
5.88
13.79
11.44  
18.42 
* p < .05 by t test. **p < .001 by t test.Kinds of differences
A possible concern here is that, rather than carrying out
structural alignment, subjects may simply have developed some
simple algorithm for listing differences that happened to be eas-
ier to do for high-similarity pairs than for low-similarity pairs.
For example, subjects might have consistently listed differ-
ences along a particular dimension. Such a method might be
easier to apply to the high-similarity pairs because the proba-
bility of their sharing any given dimension is high. This expla-
nation predicts a narrower range of differences for the high-
similarity pairs than for the low-similarity pairs. To evaluate
this possibility, we examined the types of differences that were
listed. Table 2 presents the kinds of differences that make up at
least 4% of the differences listed for high- and low-similarity
pairs. The results show that a considerably wider range of dif-
ferences was available for the similar pairs than for the dissim-
ilar pairs. The four most frequent types of differences listed for
low-similarity pairs account for 76% of the differences listed,
while the seven most frequently listed differences for high-
similarity pairs account for only 62% of the differences listed.
Thus, it does not appear that subjects adopted a narrow strategy
that favored the high-similarity pairs.
The fact that a wider range of differences was available for
similar pairs than for dissimilar pairs is consistent with the
structural alignment tenet that perceived commonalities and dif-
ferences are intimately related. On this view, similar items,
which have much common structure, have more points of par-
tial overlap that can give rise to associated differences. Further-
more, the differences for similar pairs are likely to be specific
and variable because there are many points of partial overlap to
choose from (e.g., power source and temperature). In contrast,
for the dissimilar pairs, there are fewer points of overlap, and
thus a few general dimensions, such as function and category
type, gave rise to most of the listed differences.
An alternative account of the data
These results suggest that differences are found more easily
for similar pairs than for dissimilar pairs. However, it is possi-
ble that subjects responded more often to the high-similarity
pairs than to the low-similarity pairs simply because the high-
similarity pairs were more salient. In this case, the greater num-
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ber and variety of differences listed for high-similarity pairs
would simply reflect greater attention to these pairs, not greater
ease of computing differences for them. To check this possibil-
ity, we repeated the methodology of Experiment I with pair
similarity as a between-subjects factor. Thus, in Experiment 2,
half of the subjects received only high-similarity pairs, while the
other half received only low-similarity pairs. On the structural
alignment view, subjects presented with high-similarity pairs
should list more differences (specifically, alignable differences)
than subjects presented with low-similarity pairs. If the advan-
tage for high-similarity pairs in Experiment 1 reflected neglect
of the low-similarity pairs, the effect should disappear or be
reversed in this between-subjects version.
EXPERIMENT 2
Me hod
Subjects
Subjects were 49 undergraduate students at Northwestern
University. One subject was dropped from this study for listing
commonalities instead of differences, leaving 48 subjects (24
per condition).
Materials
The same word pairs were used as in Experiment 1. In this
study, the 40 high-similarity word pairs were placed in two
columns on one sheet. The 40 low-similarity word pairs were
also placed on one sheet. Four different orders were created for
each set.
Procedure and scoring
The procedure and scoring for this study were the same as
for Experiment 1. The initial scorings showed 98% agreement,
and all discrepancies in scoring were resolved by discussion.
Design
Two levels of similarity (low and high) were varied between
subjects. There were four stimulus orders for each level of sim-
Dedre Gentner and Arthur B. Markman
Table 2. Types of differences accounting for at least 4% of
the total in Experiment I
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Low-similarity pairs High-similarity pairs
Type Percentage Type Percentage
Function 42 Parts 18
Category 23 Function 17
Parts 6 Size 8
Material 5 Location 6
Power source 5
Age 4
Temperature 4
Total 76 Total 62Differences and Similarity
ilarity. The numbers of alignable differences and nonalignable
differences were counted as in Experiment 1.
Re  l   and Di c   ion
Number of differences listed
As shown in Table 1, the results of this study resembled
those of Experiment 1. More differences were listed for the
high-similarity pairs (M = 18.42) than for the low-similarity
pairs (M = 13.79), t(46) = 2.69, p < .01. Also as in Experiment
1, this difference stems chiefly from the greater number of align-
able differences listed for high-similarity pairs (M = 15.63) than
for low-similarity pairs (M = 11.54), t(46) = 2.06, p < .05.
Once again, the number of nonalignable differences listed did
not differ significantly between groups (M = 2.79 for the high-
similarity pairs, M = 2.25 for the low-similarity pairs), t(46) --
0.47, p > .10. These data rule out the possibility that the results
of Experiment 1 can be attributed to subjects  selection of sa-
lient pairs. These results provide additional support for the pre-
diction that differences are found more easily when the pairs are
easy to align than when they are hard to align.
Kinds of differences
As before, we analyzed the content of the difference listings.
Table 3 presents the types of differences accounting for 4% or
more of the total for high- and low-similarity pairs. This analysis
parallels the content analysis for Experiment 1. Once again,
many fewer categories are required to account for the differ-
ences listed for the low-similarity pairs than to account for the
differences listed for the high-similarity pairs. As in Experiment
1, it appears that subjects had a greater variety of differences to
choose from for high-similarity pairs than for low-similarity
pairs.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, these studies provide strong support for the
claim that similarity comparisons highlight differences related
to the common structure. Subjects were able to find differences
156
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Table 3. Types of differences accounting for at least 4% of
the total in Experiment 2
for similar pairs more easily than for dissimilar pairs, even
though virtually any property of the items in the dissimilar pairs
was probably a difference. These rather striking results bear out
the claim that the natural way of making comparisons favors
alignable differences and add support to the view that the pro-
cess of similarity comparison is one of structural alignment. 
This finding lends further support to our proposed taxonomy of
commonalities, alignable differences, and nonalignable differ-
ences (Markman   Gentner, 1993a).
The content analyses help to emphasize the flexibility of
comparison. For dissimilar pairs, the comparison makes only a
few general types of differences easily available (i.e., those of
function, parts, category, and material). In contrast, a wide
range of differences was listed for high-similarity pairs. Thus, a
number of commonalities and differences are made available for
similar pairs, which are likely to be important to other cognitive
processes. Further, these differences often reflect specific
properties of items. These results are consistent with Goldstone
and Medin s (in press) finding that in picture comparison, peo-
ple are more sensitive to mismatches between features of highly
alignable pairs than to mismatches between features of pairs
that are difficult to align.
The results obtained here suggest that commonalities and
differences are fundamentally related. There is some evidence
suggesting that commonalities and differences are seen as
linked early in development. Webb, Oliveri, and O Keeffe
(1974) found that young children who were asked to select ob-
jects that were different from each other often selected similar,
or even identical, objects. Even older children selected similar
objects, although they selected identical objects less often than
younger children. In other work, Karmiloff-Smith (1990) asked
children to draw pictures of people that "do not exist." Like
medieval monks drawing demons, these children tended to
draw figures with many commonalities with and a few alignable
differences from real people (e.g., a person with two heads,
three legs, and .ix arms). Thus, the range of allowable "non-
2. We leave open the possibility that there are instructions that
would lead subjects to find differences more easily for dissimilar pairs
than for similar pairs.
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Low-similarity pairs High-similarity pairs
Type Percentage Type Percentage
Function 54 Parts 17
Category 20 Function 12
Size 11
Power source 7
Temperature 5
Age 4
Complexity 4
Location 4
Total 74 Total 64people" seems to be constrained by the addition of alignable
differences rather than by the addition of nonalignable differ-
ences. Taken together, these findings suggest that children act
as if similarity and difference are intimately relate,!.
We believe that the notion of structural alignment and the
connection between commonalities and differences can illumi-
nate the study of other psychological processes as well. For
example, in decision making, Tversky s (1972) elimination-by-
aspects model postulates that when deciding between multiple
alternatives, people first find  a relevant aspect (e.g., dimension
or property) of the choices and then eliminate all alternatives
that do not have a satisfactory value for that aspect. If more
than one item remains, another aspect is selected, and the pro-
cess repeats. In this model, the decision process utilizes align-
able differences among alternatives.
In other work, Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) presented
subjects with test scores of pairs of students. One score came
from a test taken by both students, and the second came from
two different tests, each taken by only one of the students.
Subjects consistently gave more weight to the scores on the test
that both students had taken. This finding may be interpreted as
evidence that subjects found alignable differences (different
scores on the same test) more relevant to the choice task than
nonalignable differences (different scores on different tests).
Similarly, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) varied the ease with
which the dimensions of choices could be aligned and found
that subjects  decisions were more likely to stray from optimal-
ity when the dimensions of the choices were hard to align than
when they were easy to align. Such findings suggest that the
ability to make decisions that appear rational may depend in
part on people s ability to align the aspects of the choices ap-
propriately.
CONCLUSIONS
Recent evidence suggests  that the process that determines
similarity may be profitably characterized as alignment and
mapping between structured representations. The present stud-
ies extend previous findings by suggesting that the determina-
tion of correspondences between representations is a vital part
of comparison, even in tasks that call for finding the mis-
matches between representations. Thus, commonalities and
alignable differences are crucial components of similarity. Fur-
ther work must examine the role of alignable differences in
other cognitive processes that involve comparisons.
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Table Al. High- and low-similarity word pairs used in Experiments I and 2
Similar pairs Dissimilar pairs
Light bulb Candle VCR Lounge chair
Kitten Cat Hammock Horse track
Magazine Newspaper Bed Hockey
Bowl Mug Football Boutique
Phone book Dictionary Kite Painting
Microphone Stereo speaker Sculpture Navy
Piano Organ Army Abacus
Air conditioner Furnace Calculator Escalator
Freezer Refrigerator Stairs Stool
Hammer Mallet Broom Sailboat
Bicycle Tricycle Yacht Missile
Dumpster Garbage can Chair Banana split
Lake Ocean Ice cream sundae Clock
Telephone CB radio McDonald s Couch
Diamond Ruby Police car Burger King
Sponge Towel Rocket Motel
Computer Typewriter Hotel Tape deck
Staple Paper clip Watch Ambulance
Shoe Sandal Casino Mop
Chemistry Biology Stove Hang glider
VCR Tape deck Light bulb Cat
Hammock Lounge chair Kitten Newspaper
Bed Couch Magazine Mug
Casino Horse track Bowl Dictionary
Police car Ambulance Phone book Stereo speaker
Football Hockey Microphone Organ
Store Boutique Piano Furnace
Kite Hang glider Air conditioner Mallet
Sculpture Painting Hammer Tricycle
Army Navy Bicycle Refrigerator
Calculator Abacus Freezer Ocean
Stairs Escalator Lake Garbage can
Broom Mop Dumpster CB radio
Yacht Sailboat Telephone Ruby
Chair Stool Diamond Towel
Rocket Missile Sponge Typewriter
Hotel Motel Computer Sandal
Ice cream sundae Banana split Shoe Paper clip
McDonald s Burger King Staple Biology
Watch Clock Chemistry Candle